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After attempting – and largely failing – to delimit a distinct field of interpersonal pragmatics, 
this paper explores what is distinctive about interpersonal pragmatic practice; that is, what 
makes it different from the scholarly tradition of pragmatics. Three facets of practice are 
discussed: its aims, its approach to data (what aspects are brought into relatively clear 
focus) and its analysis of data. The common thread running through what is found is a 
changed, more modest, place for language, the understanding of which is no longer the 
assumed goal of scholarship, the size of examples of which for analysis have become larger 
and the use of which is no longer the single focus of analysis. It is argued that this last 
development should point the way to a particular procedure for analysing interaction. 
Accordingly, the paper proceeds to an example analysis of one piece of data. 
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1. Introduction: what interpersonal pragmatics studies 
What – if anything – is new about interpersonal pragmatics? Any scholarly discipline or 
practice can be characterised in terms of two broad features: what it studies and how. In 
reality, though, these two features are linked because the conceptualisation of a particular 
object of study inevitably prompts particular kinds of approach and certain constraints. This 
interdependence is well illustrated by the issues raised in the introduction to this special issue 
(Haugh et al 2013).  
Like the introduction, this paper is chiefly concerned with the question of how. 
However, in view of the abovementioned linkage, a brief consideration of the field itself is 
advisable. This can be described in its most general sense as that of language use between 
people. However, this paper below (end of section 3 onwards) advocates an approach that 
integrates other modalities, so for ‘language use’here I immediately substitute 
‘communication’. This substitution has the effect of making a large field even larger, and one 
barely distinguishable from that of pragmatics generally. A smaller field can be carved out by 
stipulating that interpersonal pragmatics investigates (1) communication between identified 
people (that is, those who can pick each other out, thereby excluding mass media 
communication) and (2), following Haugh et al (2013), actual instances of such 
communication (thereby relegating reports of or comments on it to a supporting role). But 
even this narrower definition does not distinguish the field from conversation analysis or 
interactional sociolinguistics.  
Is a stricter delimitation possible? Two smaller territories spring to mind. One is 
communication only between people in very small groups. The other territory is a distributed 
one, not restricted as to numbers of people but restricted to those parts of communication 
which impact in some way on interpersonal relations. Both these attempts at a clearer 
definition are referred to by Arundale (2013a), the former as ‘micro-social contexts’ and the 
latter as ‘relational contexts’. If the micro-social is just a matter of participant numbers, it is a 
conceptually straightforward criterion. It would, of course, be pointless to pick an upper-limit 
number of interactants out of the air, but crucially its lower limit is two and its prototype 
would be two people in a closed encounter (i.e. without bystanders in attendance).  
 The prototype relational context would be one both in which the interactants construe 
their relationship as a relatively intimate one (e.g. friends or close relatives rather than a 
working one) and behave accordingly and also in which the focus of attention is personal (i.e. 
about one or more of the participants and/or their feelings rather than a task or an object of 
transaction). However, as Haugh et al (2013) show, it is not at all difficult to find 
interpersonal communication occurring in contexts a long way from this prototype. 
Moreover, it is axiomatic among most scholars of interaction that participants of any kind of 
encounter cannot help – through their behaviour – projecting a view of themselves, their 
fellow participants(s) and - as a result - the relationship pertaining between them. This is the 
entailment of interaction which Erving Goffman repeatedly emphasised (e.g. Goffman 1971) 
and attempted to capture, for instance through the notion of face (Goffman 1967) or through 
his study of self-presentation (Goffman 1959). In addition, it can be been shown (Goffman 
1981: 6-27) that almost all occasions of interaction seem to depend for their constitution and 
conduct not only on what is necessary for messages to be communicated (the ‘system 
requirements’) but also – and more basically so - on various kinds of recognition of the 
participants as social beings (the ‘ritual requirements’). In this sense, any context involving 
identified or identifiable individuals has at least some relational elements. (The apparently 
unpromising example analysed at the end of this paper demonstrates this fact.) 
The centre of the field of interpersonal pragmatics, then, can be pinpointed. As 
Arundale (2013a) observes, micro-social and relational contexts tends to go together – 
relations between people are usually more relevant when there are fewer of them involved. 
But the boundaries of the field are eye-wateringly fuzzy. It is presumably for this reason that 
Haugh et al (2013) opt to define interpersonal pragmatics as a ‘perspective’; that is, in terms 
of how the field is approached rather than the field itself.  
It is on approach and analysis that the rest of this paper focuses. It does not offer the 
wide-ranging, comprehensive discussion of issues (quite rightly) found in the introduction.  
Instead, it considers some aspects of current scholarly practice in the context of their 
historical roots. Interpersonal pragmatics has arisen from pragmatics, whose origins were in 
the philosophy of language and as an offshoot of formal linguistics. These origins set the 
course for the pragmatic scholarship, a course aimed at investigating how context and other 
aspects of situation can be incorporated into the study of what utterances mean in order to 
provide a satisfactory account of what people mean and understand when those utterances are 
uttered. 
This paper attempts to identify and then exemplify the most significant ways in which 
the practice of interpersonal pragmatics is deviating from this historical course. Section 2 
considers the role of interpersonal pragmatics in the furtherance of human knowledge as a 
whole. Section 3 discusses scholarly approaches to data. Section 4 discusses the mechanics of 
examining data. The common thread running through the deviations identified is the 
treatment of language. And it is found that, in different ways, language suffers a general 
demotion. Section 5 then offers an extended analysis of some data, intended to exemplify the 




2. What interpersonal pragmatics is for 
The most general, half-hidden but wide-reaching deviation of interpersonal pragmatics from 
its pragmatics roots concerns the assumed end-point, the wider social ‘take-away value’, in 
studying the field. Why do interpersonal pragmatics anyway? Physicists try to understand the 
nature of the inanimate physical world; biologists try to understand the nature and workings 
of life. And linguists, of course, try to understand the nature and workings of language. 
Notwithstanding its influences from semiotics and philosophy, the chiefly linguistic origins 
of pragmatics have meant that it has traditionally partaken of this endeavour, conceived of 
and presented as a contribution to the understanding of language.  
Even after pragmatics had become established as a field in its own right, this largely 
presupposed underlying goal remained firmly linguistic. In 1983, two scholarly tomes 
addressing the subject as a whole were published. In the preamble to his monograph on 
Principles of Pragmatics, Leech (1983) after welcoming a perceived “shift of direction 
within linguistics away from ‘competence’ and towards ‘performance’” goes on: 
 
but the resulting pluralism has meant that no comprehensive paradigm has yet emerged as a 
successor to generative grammar. A unified account of what language is has, I believe, been 
lost. Hence the purpose of this book is to argue in favour of a fresh paradigm [which] will 
concentrate on arguing the validity of a particular view of the distinction between grammar and 
pragmatics. This argument ... will have fundamental implications for the way one looks at 
language … We cannot understand the nature of language without studying both these domains, 
and the interaction between them.      (Leech 1983: 4) 
 
Notice that it is the contemporary lack of a “comprehensive paradigm” and loss of “a unified 
account”of language which gives the book its “purpose”. The argument concerning the 
relation of grammar and pragmatics is to be seen as a contribution towards these desiderata 
(“fundamental implications for the way one looks at language”) because without studying this 
relation “we cannot understand the nature of language”. The preamble proceeds (Leech 1983: 
4-5) to the presentation of a set of postulates whose effect is to define “two separate 
paradigms of research, making up a single ‘complex’ paradigm for linguistics” and concludes 
with the observation that by developing such paradigms “we are determining the background 
assumptions on which the search for truth about language will proceed with increased 
understanding”. 
In Leech’s work, then, the concern is to situate pragmatics within linguistics and its 
presupposed underlying value is “understand[ing] the nature of language” and “the search for 
truth about language”. Published in the same year, Levinson’s (1983) textbook on the subject, 
in its emphasis on the relation between pragmatics and semantics (and especially on how the 
former can contribute to the latter), has the same assumed ultimate goal – an understanding of 
the nature of language. (See section 4 below for further examples of this ‘language bias’ in 
general works.) 
Scholars of interpersonal pragmatics, often without being explicit about it, have been 
turning their long-view gaze in another direction. In explanation for the reissue to their 
seminal work, which relies heavily on a version of the non-linguistic notion of face, Brown & 
Levinson (1987: 1) observe that the matters they address “have a perennial importance, for 
they raise questions about the foundations of human social life and interaction”. Since then, 
in and around the area which has become known as (im)politeness studies, a shift in focus 
from the linguistic actions of the speaker towards their affective effect on hearers (Eelen 
2001, Watts 2003), followed by an attempt to define a field of ‘relational work’ (Locher & 
Watts 2005, 2008), enquiries into the complexity of what relating with others involves (e.g. 
Arundale 2006, 2010), explorations of face as distinct from (im)politeness (e,g, Bargiela-
Chiappini & Haugh 2009, O’Driscoll 2011) and a great deal of other work addressing human 
interaction, has increased the degree of shift in the long-term gaze. Face, politeness and 
relational work all presume social relations rather than language-use as the proper frame for 
their study. While the initial definition of interpersonal pragmatics adopted by Locher &  
Graham (2010: 1-2) does refer “social actors us[ing] language”, the purpose of investigation 
is to study how language is used “to shape and form relationships”, and the definition  
proceeds to refer to ‘interactions’ rather than utterances or language-use and makes no 
mention of meaning.  
No contributions to this special issue assume the advancement of the understanding of 
language as their single ultimate aim. In some, a different aim is made explicit. For Langlotz 
& Locher (2103), for instance, it is to understand the role of emotions. That is, rather than 
these cropping up as aspects of linguistic meaning conveyed, a part of an investigation into 
the interpersonal function of language, they constitute the field of enquiry in their own right, 
within which what people say is no more than a major type of evidence. True, Langlotz & 
Locher’s suggested model of interpersonal communication does not entirely elide language. It 
advises “put[ting] the connection between relational work and its emotional component at the 
centre stage of a theory of human sociality and linguistic-communicative capacities.” But 
note that language is hyphenated with communication and alongside this theory, of equal 
importance, is a theory of ‘sociality’. 
Within the practice of interpersonal pragmatics, then, the assumed endpoint, the 
ultimate goal which motivates the practice, has been shifting away from understanding the 
nature of language towards the understanding of human relations. This shift has implications 
for the role played by language in analyses. These are explored below. 
 
3. The focus of analysis in interpersonal pragmatics: from speakers to participants 
Politeness studies was first built on a Gricean foundation. That is, the original major 
contributions to the field (Leech 1980[1977], 1983; Brown & Levinson 1978[1987]) were 
attempts to build on Grice’s answer to the question of how people manage to understand each 
other when they don’t literally spell out what they mean and proceed to the question of why 
they so often don’t spell out what they mean.  
Two points about this foundation (the ‘how’ question) and its development (the ‘why’ 
question) are worth observing. One is that both questions contain a presupposition of an 
objective meaning which is somehow already ‘out there’ (or, perhaps one should say, ‘in 
there’), a meaning which speakers can then choose to emit either transparently through their 
words (following Grice’s conversational maxims) or with varying degrees of refraction 
(hence implicature). This assumption arguably entails – and certainly implies - a simplistic 
encode-decode model of communication (see Arundale 2013a, Grainger, 2013). It also has 
consequences for analytical perspective. Although Grice’s ‘how’ question involves an 
enquiry into inferential processes, and therefore into the cognitive activity of the hearer, the 
target of this activity is the decoding of the meaning intended by the speaker.  
The second point is that the movement from the ‘how’ question to the ‘why’ question 
placed the emphasis even more decisively on speaker intentions, the effort being to seek 
explanation for why the speaker says what s/he says. Hence Leech (1983) offers a set of 
interpersonal maxims which guide speakers and Brown & Levinson (1987) offer a set of 
strategies from which the speaker selects what s/he deems to be most useful in the 
circumstances.  
Such enquiries and schemes are always potentially valuable. The evidence which has 
been found for regularities and norms regarding what people say in particular types of 
intentional circumstances (i.e. when performing certain speech acts) is evidence which it 
would be foolish to ignore because, as Grainger (2013) reminds us, they form part of the 
background against which interactants evaluate what they actually say on real-life occasions. 
But an unremitting focus on the speaker’s behaviour can have – and in too much scholarship 
has had – a number of unfortunate effects. In the first place, it is unrealistic in its sketching of 
a strategic, manipulative speaker on the one hand and a passive, innocent hearer on the other 
(Eelen 2001: 10). Secondly, it can result in a tendency to abstraction from actual instances of 
interaction and the use of invented, introspected or elicited rather than naturally occurring 
utterances and, thirdly, with a consequent presentation of speaker utterances as if they had 
pre-determined, pan-situational effects. It can even result, as many have noticed (e.g. Mills 
2011), in an assumption of a 1:1 relation between forms, functions (speech acts) and effects. 
However, the blandishments of discursive pragmaticians regarding the error of this 
assumption are really unnecessary. Neither Brown & Levinson (1987) nor Leech (1983), nor 
any serious speech act theorist, has ever claimed such an equation. It is just that if one starts 
from the speaker’s viewpoint of how to do a particular thing X with words (e.g. make an 
apology), then the next step is inevitably to find some ways of doing X (e.g. in English, I’m 
so sorry, I would like to apologise, sorry ……). To provide a list of such exponents is neither 
to claim that the list is exhaustive (there are always, of course, other ways of doing X) nor to 
claim that X is the only thing the listed exponents can do.  
Nevertheless, the existence of these misapprehensions points to the desirability of the 
shift of focus which is occurring away from the speaker towards the hearer. This shift 
necessarily involves a move away from the intention of what is said towards the effect of 
what is said. In the process, it helps to undermine the unfortunate practices noted in the 
paragraph above.  
For one thing, it encourages the study of naturally occurring data. This is because 
hearers are harder to idealise than speakers. It is conceptually easy to ask informants what 
they would say in particular circumstances or to elicit from them what they say in 
experimental conditions, but trickier to ask them how they would evaluate what someone else 
says or to elicit such evaluations experimentally. 
Secondly, once the hearer is centre stage, s/he gets accorded some agency and can no 
longer be treated as mere passive receptacle. Thus has the notion of evaluation take on a 
prominent position in the field. Within im/politeness studies, evaluation is the perception and 
then forming of a judgment as to the rightness or wrongness, niceness or nastiness of a 
participant’s interactive behaviour and hence a contribution to an assessment of that person 
and/or their relationship with the evaluator. Haugh (2103) picks up on Eelen’s (2001) 
insistence that evaluation is the core of im/politeness. He strengthens this view by noting that 
these evaluations can themselves become the object of evaluation and that speech acts 
themselves contain evaluations The way in which a request is formulated, for example, 
indicates the speaker’s assessment of his/her entitlement to make it. In this second respect, 
evaluation is just another way of conceptualising the accepted fact that any move in 
interaction unavoidably expresses a view of self, other, relationship and situation 
simultaneously. But it is a suggestive term because it connotes subjectively assessed value, 
that the view projected is not just descriptive but moral, containing within it assessments of 
the socially right/wrong, good/bad etc.  
Evidence of the attention now given in scholarship to the hearer is Haugh’s (2103) 
attempt to find hearer-counterparts for Goffman’s (1981: 144-152) deconstruction of the 
speaker into several roles. In fact, the importance of evaluation can – and should – put limits 
on the shift of focus from speaker to hearer. This is because evaluation can be performed by 
all participants to an encounter (see Eelen 2001: 109 and Haugh 2103), including the speaker. 
But this realisation encourages a further development. Participants, as opposed to hearers or 
speakers, belong not to utterances but to interaction. (Hence the drive exemplified by many of 
the contributions in this issue to examine stretches of interaction longer than the single 
utterance or adjacency pair.) The significance of this development – the situation swimming 
into focus – is addressed in the next section. 
 
4. The procedure for analysis in interpersonal pragmatics 
In a scene from the American TV sitcom The Big Bang Theory, Leonard, one of the 
occupants of a shared apartment, arrives through the door of the apartment one evening 
carrying bags of take-away food. He and his flatmate, the academically brilliant but aspergic 
Sheldon, exchange minimal greetings and then the following occurs:  
 
Leonard: Hope you’re hungry. 
Sheldon: Interesting. A friendly sentiment in this country, cruel taunt in the Sudan. It’s a 
lesson in context.1 
 
For the regular audience of this comedy, the fact that Sheldon, instead of responding 
appropriately to his flatmate’s expressed wish, makes a metapragmatic comment on it is 
characteristic of his alienation from social interaction. In this case, the characterisation is 
compounded by his added comment about ‘a lesson in context’, thereby highlighting that, 
from a practical viewpoint, it is a lesson he has failed to learn!  
And there is a further absurdity. His flatmate has arrived through the door, not long 
before the normal time for their evening meal, carrying bags of food. They both know it is 
time to eat; Leonard’s entry with food for both of them has been expected; they both know 
this setting is the one in which they habitually eat their evening meal; their relationship is not 
overtly hostile. In this context, any competent interactant in Sheldon’s position could be 
expected to interpret Leonard’s remark as either a generalised benediction (Sheldon’s 
‘friendly sentiment’) or, possibly, as an implicature that Leonard believes he has brought 
home an unnecessarily large amount of food (although as Sheldon is not looking at Leonard 
at the time, and Leonard’s prosody is not marked, this is less likely on this occasion). 
Sheldon’s raising of the possibility of a different interpretation for which there is no 
conceivable contextual warrant is not a lesson in context at all; rather, it is the wilful ignoring 
of context. 
It is ironic, therefore, that this very example has been cited in blogs by the president 
of a leadership and workforce productivity consultancy firm, as an “important leadership 
lesson”2 and by the CEO of a communications skills training company, who observes that 
Sheldon “notices something that most of us take for granted: Context” (original emphasis).3   
And yet such misguided uptake is not really so far away from habitual analytical practices in 
scholarly pragmatics in the sense that, as a result of its linguistic and philosophy-of-language 
origins, this has traditionally started off with the words and then added on aspects of situation 
to help explain them afterwards. Brief characterisations of pragmatics reflect this history. 
Thus Simpson (1989: 119-158) formulates the subject as “semantics + situation”; Jaszcolt 
(2002: 1) characterises it as “a study of how hearers add contextual information to the 
semantic structure”; the summing up of the first chapter of Grundy’s textbook begins  
“pragmaticians study the way in which language is appropriate to the context in which it is 
used” (Grundy 2000: 19); even Mey, whose overview of the field stresses the social more 
than any other, describes pragmatics as “the use of language in human communication as 
determined by the conditions of society” (Mey, 2001: 6). In all cases, then, the language 
comes first, context second.  
It is for this historical reason, presumably, that pragmatic scholarly works which 
include non-linguistic communication (e.g. body language, facial expression or other visual 
signals) in their analysis usually feel the need to label such analysis ‘multi-modal’ - as if 
                                                          




language produced in a physical vacuum were the default case. Non-linguistic signals, then, 
constitute another aspect of context sometimes ‘added’ to the study of the words.  
What the TV sitcom example illustrates is that this word-centred starting point, this 
sequencing is, from the viewpoint of participants in interaction, counter-intuitive. When 
interpreting utterances, interactants do not first hear the semantic content and then sift 
through a list of possible contexts to find one which fits. They are already in the context. 
They start with that and it is the words that are interpreted to fit.  
I therefore wish to suggest that if we are serious about aiming at understanding the 
role of interaction in human social relations as our goal, and especially if we are serious about 
a participant perspective on interaction, our analyses need to remove words from their 
traditionally central position. We need, first, to adopt a radically Goffmanian perspective (e.g. 
Goffman 1964) which starts with the situation – that is, with the mutually aware co-presence 
of individuals– as its frame. To this frame within which analysis is to take place, we also 
need to take account of all relevant aspects of extra-situational context. These broader aspects 
of context include both the sociocultural and the interpersonal (i.e. any previous dealings 
which interactants have had with each other).They are crucial simply because they are the 
perspective from which the participants themselves start. The participants bring along with 
them these culturally-conditioned general norms and interpersonal habits of interactive 
behaviour to the situation and it is against these that they will conceptualise what sort of 
event is taking place (cf. Goffman’s 1963 notion of occasion or Levinson’s 1992 notion of 
activity type) and therefore interpret their own and others’ behaviour within the spate of 
interaction to be examined.  
Two matters of practice follow from this starting point. First, while it will not be 
always necessary to examine in detail the whole interactive event, any spate of interaction to 
be examined must at least be referred to it. In practice, analyses invariably address what 
Goffman (1963) calls ‘focused interaction’; that is, interaction in which participants recognise 
each other as such and take part in an ’encounter’ (typically with words). But the wider 
situation, involving bystanders in a particular physical setting, is often relevant. 
Second, the default unit of data analysis must be a move; that is, any action or adopted 
state which appears to have a bearing on the development of the encounter (Goffman 1981: 
23-29). This may be an utterance or a CA turn but it does not have to be. 
 
… visible human conduct is integral with the use of linguistic forms. There is only one system 
of embodied communicative behavior, not a system of visible conduct distinct from a system of 
linguistic behavior.        (Arundale 2013a) 
 
This procedure is especially important when studying human relating. The identification and 
evaluation of emotions is crucial to the affective aspects of interaction and, as Langlotz & 
Locher (2103) wisely insist, emotions are not encode-able (not even through linguistic cues, 
let alone other types). Rather, they are index-able. A procedure which dealt exclusively with 
verbal contributions might there miss these crucial aspects.  
In this volume, several contributions provide analyses of pieces of interaction 
according to their visions of an interpersonal approach. However, they do not analyse 
encounters as such. The sets of data tend to commence in situ, with only partial information 
on the position of this set in the situation as a whole or when and exactly where the 
participants came into each other’s presence. And yet this information might be crucial to 
understanding what takes place.  
In the next section of this paper, I offer an analysis of a piece of interaction which 
attempts to operationalise the perspective outlined above. Its purpose being methodological 
rather than substantive, the analysis is long and fairly exhaustive, to the extent that the reader 
may find it bordering on the tedious at times. I crave the reader’s indulgence. I have done my 
best to make the account as lively as possible.   
This encounter (like those of Arundale and Grainger in this issue) is mundane and 
involves a canonically occupation-based relationship which is nevertheless of interpersonal 
relevance, not only because all encounters have some interpersonal element to them (see 
section 1 above) but also the participants consider it likely that will encounter each other 
again. Although it is mundane, it does not take a completely stereotypical course. I also offer 
it, then, as an example of the frequent messiness of interaction.  
 
 
5. Example analysis 
 
5.1 The situation 
The interaction takes place in Canterbury, England, in a newsagent’s in a row of shops just 
outside the town centre. It is early morning in September.The gathering consists first of a 
middle-aged female shop worker and a middle-aged man engaged in focused interaction of a 
social kind. Then another middle-aged man enters and buys a newspaper, while the shop-
worker’s first co-participant exits the shop. Finally, the second man exits the shop too.  
This trajectory – from two people to three people to two people again - is to be 
expected because the situation is a public one: this being a shop during opening hours, 
anybody has the right to enter at any time. The encounters which take place there are 
therefore either actually open (involving bystanders in the shop who are not part of the 
focused interaction) or potentially so (in that a new participant may enter the situation at any 
time without first asking permission). 
 
5.2 The extra-situational context 
In shops in England (and many other parts of the world), it is conventional to soften the 
starkness of encounters which, instrumentally, are purely transactional with some nods to 
interpersonal relations. These commonly take the form of words (as opposed, for example, to 
conventional physical gestures). The words uttered by the shop worker upon receiving money 
from the customer in this encounter (see below), where no words at all are strictly necessary 
for the transaction to be achieved (but more on this below), are an example. 
Narrowing down from culturally conditioned practices to geographical location, the 
setting is a shop in a residential area of a medium-sized town, so that for shop workers to 
spend time chatting with customers is more expected and acceptable than it would be in a 
large high street store, partly because the interactants might realistically expect to encounter 
each other on many future occasions. At the same time, it is not a general store in a village, so 
that chatting is not the dominant norm either; the urban value of time as a commodity is 
assumed to take precedence.   
This shop is a typical British neighbourhood newsagent’s. It purveys mostly everyday 
items for purchase, none of which require any kind of processing (e.g. packaging) before they 
can be taken away. Shop workers are not expected to have any specialist knowledge of the 
merchandise or to actively encourage sales; some might assist customers with choosing their 
purchases if asked, but in fact most customers know exactly what they want before they 
enter. Like most such shops in Britain, the shop in which this encounter takes place is part of 
a chain of such shops, so that it can be assumed that the shop worker is an employee, not a 
proprietor.      
Two of the participants – the shop worker and her first co-participant - are personally 
known to each other, in the sense that they have participated in encounters together before, 
while the third is a stranger to them, as they are to him.   
 5.3 Transcription 
The transcription below was composed from memory on the same day as the interaction it 
represents. (I myself was the abovementioned second man.) It adopts a stave format rather 
than a CA format because it makes timing and simultaneous doings relatively easy to view 
(see Bousfield 2008: 8) and, crucially, because many of these doings are non-verbal. The 
non-verbal doings are described within square brackets (in block language in order to save 
space). A series of dots (…) after a description indicates continuation of a state or activity. 
Absence of such dots indicates that what is being described is an action which might be 
interpreted by participants as a move. 
Asst below is the female the shop worker, Cs1 and Cs2 are the two male customers. In 
order to make reading no more difficult than necessary, participants are not given separate 
lines for non-verbal doings and speech, even though this means that timing is not always 
represented accurately. For example, in stave 3, Asst actually picks up the coins at the same 
time as saying “40p” (and not, as represented, just beforehand.) For the same ease-of-reading 
reason, standard orthography is used. 
The full transcription can be found immediately below, but for reader-convenience 
parts of it are reproduced further below. 
 
1 Cs1 [standing in front of counter, chatting with Asst …...………………………………] 
Asst [standing behind counter, chatting with Cs1 ………..………………………………….] 
Cs2 [enters shop]  [picks newspaper from shelves] [walks towards counter] 
 
2 Cs1 [chatting with Asst…………………………..…..] [turns from counter, walks away]  
Asst [chatting with Cs1 ………………….....................] 
Cs2 [stands near Cs1, looking at him, with newspaper...................] [moves up to counter] 
 
3 Cs1         [exits shop] 
Asst    [picks up coins] 40p [puts coins in till]Thank you 
Cs2 [puts newspaper &40p on counter] 
 
4 Asst [looking into middle distance ….. [rubs hands vigorously]    Yes, 
Cs2 [standing at counter ………………………………….…]Cold today, isn’t it? 
    
5 Asst it’s that door. People open it and then it gets stuck. 
Cs2      ‘d you like me to close it on the way out? 
 
6 Asst Oh, if you wouldn’t mind. Thanks.          It gets stuck, you see. 
Cs2 [picks up newspaper from counter] Sure [turns away][walks towards door] Yeah 
 
 
5.4 The action 
What happens at the start of this encounter demonstrates the necessity of taking moves (rather 
than turns) as units of analysis. Cs2’s approach to the counter at the end of stave 1 and his 
continued stance there (stave 2) signals a wish to change his interactive status from bystander 
to ratified participant. He makes no attempt at a verbal contribution, but just stands there 
holding the newspaper, allowing the two existing ratified participants to infer that (this being 
a shop where papers are sold) his intention might simply be to engage Asst in a transaction. 
However, his stance at some slight distance from the others (stave 2) indicates that he is not 
going to butt in, leaving open the possibility that he wishes, instead or also, to join the 
conversation. By turning away (end stave 2), Cs1 closes this latter possibility, creating an 
expectation that Asst and Cs2 will now conduct the transaction.  
At this point (start of stave 3), Cs1 having uttered no word of farewell to Asst, it is not 
clear whether Cs1 intends to exit the situation or just to withdraw temporarily while the 
transaction takes place. This uncertainty provides one possible reason why Cs2 also says 
nothing as he initiates the transaction by placing the newspaper and money on the counter. A 
brief word of greeting (“Hi there”, “Morning”) or self-explanation (“Just this, please”) might 
be normatively expected here. Its absence may be interpreted by Asst as signalling a ‘polite’ 
wish not to intrude on their conversation and/or as symbolically indicating that he is in a 
hurry (symbolically only because the words he might have uttered would not in themselves 
have taken up extra time). However, the possibility of this latter interpretation is reduced by 
the fact that Cs2 has not instantaneously made his move up to the counter when Cs1 turns 
away (see middle stave 2). Other evaluations for Cs2’s silence on the part of Asst are 
possible, for example that this person is just not the voluble type and/or not the sociable type, 
or even that he is performing a silent rebuke by withholding the normal pleasantries because 
he has been kept waiting. (And perhaps that stance in close proximity to Cs1 was itself part of 
this ‘polite’ but rather self-righteous rebuke?) For his part, because Asst has herself also 
uttered no word of greeting to Cs2 on his approach to the counter (end stave 2 / start stave 3), 
he probably interprets the relation that she intends between them as a purely transactional one 
(perhaps so that the conversation with Cs1 can be quickly resumed). 
Asst’s reaction to Cs2’s wordless initiation of the transaction (end of stave 3) is barely 
politic. It acknowledges in words that the transaction is proceeding successfully – “40p” plus 
picking up the coins – and that it can move straight to a close (“thank you”). Although from a 
strictly instrumental viewpoint, speech is not necessary, its total absence would fall below the 
politic norm and thus signal a negative attitude to Cs2. As it is, her behaviour is acceptably 
‘businesslike’, giving Cs2 little extra clue as to her relational attitude, though possibly 
interpretable as indicating some disgruntlement at having her socialising interrupted 
(especially if Cs2 suspects that she has interpreted his actions so far as a rebuke – see 
paragraph above). 
Between them, then, Asst and Cs2 (with some help from Cs1) have so far constructed 
a relationship for the interaction which severely limits their interpersonal connection. It can 
be seen from the above paragraphs that, although their behaviour is not especially marked 
and probably lies within the bandwidth of the politic for both of them, there have been 
choices and thus evaluations may well have been made and there may well have been some 
affective import for them. It is by reason of such phenomena that scholars (e.g. Arundale 
2006, 2103b) are entitled to speak of relations and face being constructed in interaction and 
that O’Driscoll (2007a) would describe what has occurred as negative facework.  
Note also that this mutual attention to negative face in stave 3 has acquired greater 
salience because of preceding context. It occurs against the sequential background of the 
tenor of interaction between Asst and Cs1 (stave 1), whose evident socialising in a setting 
whose primary raison d’etre is transactional is foregrounded by the intrusion of Cs2 into their 
conversational orbit at the start of stave 2 with an apparently transactional purpose. Neither 
type of interaction in this setting would be especially noticeable by itself. But together in this 
sequence, each ‘sets off’ the other – a nice example of Arundale’s (2006) dialectic between 
connection and separation (or, as O’Driscoll 2007a would have it, positive and negative 
faces). It is also, of course, a good example of the advisability of examining stretches of 
interaction which go beyond the single move/utterance or exchange. 
 
3 Cs1         [exits shop] 
Asst    [picks up coins] 40p [puts coins in till]Thank you 
Cs2 [puts newspaper &40p on counter] 
 
4 Asst [looking into middle distance … .. [rubs hands vigorously]]    Yes, 
Cs2 [standing at counter ………………………………….…] Cold today, isn’t it? 
    
 When Cs1 exits the situation (end stave 3), the possibility that he and Asst could renew their 
conversation disappears. Cs2 and Asst are left alone. However, their interaction has come to a 
potential end. Because they have constructed their relationship as non-personal, all that 
remains is for Cs2 to pick up his purchase from the counter and walk away. Normatively, this 
physical move would be accompanied with a closing “thank you”, especially because Cs2 has 
so far uttered nothing (and total lack of verbal contribution to this kind of encounter would be 
assessed as impolite in this culture). Asst certainly seems to think they are ‘done’ at this point 
as she does not engage with Cs1 in any way (start stave 4). 
However, Cs2 does not make the final move expected of him. The newspaper remains 
on the counter and he just stands there. (Why? See below) As a result, when Asst starts 
rubbing her hands in the conventional sign to indicate feeling cold (mid stave 4), and despite 
the fact that she still does not engage Cs2 in eye contact, her act becomes a potentially 
communicative one, a potential which Cs2 makes use of (end stave 4).  
Two observations at this point: First we see the value of taking into account the whole 
situation when seeking to understand moves within it. Asst’s hand-rub is the cue for a new 
sequence of interaction but this new sequence is only possible because the previous sequence 
has not been satisfactorily completed. (Note, in fact, that it is never satisfactorily completed – 
Cs2 leaves the shop without giving the conventional thanks.) Grainger’s (2103) analysis of 
interaction allows a similar observation – that a single-utterance or adjacency pair approach 
cannot account for the facework involved in topic avoidance / changing the subject because 
such an account demands attention to prior turns.  
The second observation is that what can be taken as constituting a move in interaction 
cannot always be predicted. Asst’s hand-rub is not conventionally communicative. At the 
time when it is performed, its status as a move is ambiguous. This is partly because it not 
clear at this point to the two participants whether or not they are still engaged in focused 
interaction. (Cs2’s continued presence at the counter might suggest to Asst that he thinks they 
are, or that he wishes that they are – but on the other hand maybe he is just a bit slow; Asst’s 
gaze might suggest to Cs2 that she thinks they aren’t, or that she wishes they weren’t – but on 
the other hand maybe her hand-rubbing gesture is a sign that she recognises that they are.)It is 
also because, regardless of the type of interaction the participants are engaged in, it is not 
clear whether the gesture is to be taken as on the ‘attend track’ – giving information – or on 
the ‘disattend track’, giving off information (Goffman 1963). It is only when Cs2 picks up on 
the gesture by making a remark that indexes it that it becomes analysable as a move, a status 
which has been constructed by the interactants themselves.  
 
 
4 Asst [looking into middle distance … .. [rubs hands vigorously]]    Yes, 
Cs2 [standing at counter ………………………………….…] Cold today, isn’t it? 
    
5 Asst it’s that door. People open it and then it gets stuck. 
Cs2             ‘d you like me to close it on the way out? 
 
6 Asst Oh, if you wouldn’t mind. Thanks.             It gets stuck, you see. 
Cs2 [picks up newspaper from counter] Sure  [turns away]  [walks towards door]  Yeah 
 
So (to continue) the analyst is now faced with the apparently odd case of a quintissential 
conversational opener (“Cold today, isn’t it?”) functioning as a response. One might cry foul 
here and point out that a different analysis is possible: that the hand-rub was indeed mere 
giving off, a reflex physical gesture by someone who saw themselves as not engaged in 
focused interaction at that point, and that it merely happened to give Cs2 an excuse to make 
what is indeed no more than a standard conversational opener for a (new) spate of focused 
interaction. However, there are two reasons why this analysis does not work. First, this 
particular remark occurs at an incongruous point of time. As an opener for this particular 
encounter, one would expect it to occur right at the beginning, when the customer has just 
entered, having been experiencing the cold. Second, note that Asst’s response to the remark 
(start stave 5) indexes not only the remark itself (“Yes”) but also her own gesture (“it’s that 
door …”). It offers an account for this gesture, which is that she herself feels cold, not the 
weather in general. Thus, she interprets Cs2’s remark as also indexing the gesture – and 
between them they have made the gesture an integral move in the interaction.  
Asst’s comment in stave 5, in that it is a complaint, does, however, offer the 
possibility of some conversational exchanges to follow. (Indeed, because it thematises the 
immediate, local condition of the participants, it is more promising in this respect than if she 
had interpreted Cs2’s “Cold today, isn’t it?” as a general, conventionalised remark.) This 
possibility is the greater because of the wider social context: Asst being a non-specialist 
employee, the prospect of the two of them having a good moan about their plight is more 
congruent than if the she were the proprietor (when one might expect her instead to express 
an intention to alleviate the conditions). 
But in his next verbal move (end stave 5), Cs2 appears not to take up this opportunity. 
Instead, as witnessed not only by the propositional content (“close it”) but also perhaps by the 
form of the offer (“’d you like”), he interprets her complaint as being the presentation of a 
problem to be solved. Moreover, he excludes the possibility of chat by indicating that he is 
about to leave (“on my way out”, followed at start of stave 6 by picking up his purchase from 
the counter). There is potential for this ignoring of the implied invitation to chat to be 
experienced by Asst as personal rejection (a slight to her positive face) but this potential is 
mitigated by the fact that Cs2’s utterance is a considerate offer (to shut the door). 
Asst’s response (stave 6) begins with “Oh”, which conveys an element of surprise, or 
at least unexpectedness, at Cs2’s offer, registering that, as far as she is concerned, “a marked 
shift of attention” (Heritage 1998: 294-295) has occurred. As a result, it implies an evaluation 
of that offer as incongruous with her projection of the situation in her previous remark. This 
evaluation may index the changed trajectory of interaction effectively projected by Cs2’s 
offer (away from a conversational exchange or two towards imminent termination of the 
encounter) and/or its propositional content (that something can be done about the 
unsatisfactory conditions) and/or the offer of personal help itself. With regard to this last 
possibility, the “Oh” might function as an implied disclaimer that her gesture was an attempt 
to elicit the offer4. The utterance proceeds to recognition of this personal help and grateful 
acceptance of it.  
Asst’s repetition of the origin of the unsatisfactory conditions as Cs2 leaves (end stave 
6) is interpretable as an indication that she had indeed expected that some chat would follow 
her original complaint or as emphasising why it is desirable for Cs2 to make good his offer. 
Cs2’s minimal response to this remark - a bland “Yeah” without stopping or turning round on 
his way to the exit – shows that his interpretation is the latter.  
 
5.5 Intentions and personal histories 
It will be noticed that the analysis above has largely eschewed reference to intentions. The 
only intentions and ‘wishes’ I have entertained are those concerned with participation status. 
This is because my intention has been to demonstrate how the participants in this encounter 
                                                          
4
I am grateful to Michael Haugh for drawing my attention to this possibility.  
construct their understandings about what is happening, relationally and otherwise, as they go 
along.  
However, any attempt at why the encounter took the course it did, why it turned out 
that way rather than some other way, cannot help considering the intentions of the individuals 
involved. No matter that intentions are intrinsically unobservable (Arundale 2006), that we 
often have little indirect evidence of them from the contributions made in the encounter itself, 
or that interactants themselves are frequently only hazily aware of what their intentions from 
moment to moment actually are - speculating about and inferring other’s intentions, as well 
as operating in the partial awareness of their own intentions, is something interactants 
habitually do and something which informs their own moves and their interpretings of other’s 
moves. (See Culpeper et al. 2003: 1552 for a similar argument). In addition, the content of 
this speculating and inferring is frequently relational, so we need to make use of them 
whenever we can.  
A further aspect of relevance in an attempt to account for what was said and done in 
an encounter is the personal circumstances of participants. There are limitless possibilities for 
various kinds of personal agendas and ‘cognitive statuses’ which, as Kecskes (2010) argues, a 
fully adequate account of a piece of interaction should consider. Once again, there is rarely 
evidence within an encounter for these, but again this lack does not mean we can ignore them 
in principle – only that we often have to admit a full account is not possible.   
In the case of this encounter, we have some insider knowledge to draw upon because 
Cs2 was me. At the time of this encounter, I had only recently taken up residence in England. 
(Although brought up in England, I had spent 28 of the previous 29 years living outside it.) 
This fact can explain my rather odd behaviour at the start of stave 4, where I fail to make the 
expected move of picking up the newspaper from the counter and departing with a brief word 
of thanks. The instrumental part of the explanation is that, not being familiar with 
contemporary English newsagents’ transactional systems, and this being my very first time in 
this particular newsagent’s, I was not sure whether the shop worker was supposed to scan the 
barcode of the newspaper before I left with it.  
The affective part of the explanation is that I wished for a little overtly social, non-
transactional interaction (some phatic communion, if you will) before departing the scene (in 
general because I am attitudinally inclined to leaven the transactional with the interpersonal 
and especially because my new home was just round the corner from this newsagent’s, so that 
I could expect to have dealings with this individual shop worker on future occasions). From 
the viewpoint of this intention, the encounter had not gone well for me so far. My stance near 
the counter and gaze at the conversing Cs1 (stave 2) had not resulted in my inclusion in the 
chat. When Cs1 moved away, then, I must have thought that a cheery greeting (“Morning”) in 
the light of this conversation between two apparent friends would appear unduly pushy, an 
unwarranted claim to familiarity, or (worse) might have been interpreted as a sarcastic rebuke 
for being kept waiting. Thus was the course set for interaction of an exclusively business-like 
tenor. So I was very glad of the opportunity provided by the shop worker’s hand-rubbing 
gesture to shift our footings to an interpersonal level. 
And what of the shop worker’s intentions at this point? Her gesture was performed 
without eye-contact. On the other there was no attempt to perform it privately and I was quite 
manifestly, indeed markedly, in close proximity. It might possibly be analysed, then, as an 
off-record invitation to me to make a verbal contribution. Perhaps she was hoping to elicit 
sympathy. It is even possible that she had the instrumental intention alluded to in the 
subsection above and was hoping it would lead to the outcome that it did indeed lead to –me 
closing the door for her (what Goffman 1971:173 calls a ‘set-up’). After all, it would have 
been inappropriate to ask a customer not personally known to her to do this out of the blue, 
and for the same reason (a stranger alone with her in the shop) she could not leave the till 
unguarded and walk all the way to the door to close it herself. But if she could get the 
customer to offer….. 
 It is here, of course, that we see the limitations of exploring interaction through 
participant intentions. We cannot know if such a set-up was actually her intention, not just 
because we are not her but also because she may not have known herself. Our motives for 
action in interaction, or any gathering, are often opaque to us. For example, when the shop 
worker made her complaint, why didn’t I, supposedly desirous of a bit of social chit-chat, 
accept the opportunity thereby offered? It seems that by then the chance to present myself as 
a considerate person (the offer to close the door) was more important to me. And here I have 
to confess something: having been kept waiting (an affront to my negative face), not included 
in the friends’ conversation and then dealt with in an exclusively business-like manner (both 
an affront to my positive face), I suspect I felt a certain satisfaction in being able to turn the 
tables. With her having accepted my kind offer, she became indebted to me (a threat to her 
negative face), and with me declining to engage in chit-chat, even when she re-presented the 
chance to do so (by the repetition of the complaint in stave 6), it was she whose positive face 
was left with some egg on it.  
But do not condemn me. The above is little more than conjecture. As I said, I only 
suspect myself of these intentions at this point. Certainly, I was only dimly aware of this 
possibility at the time. It is only now, in retrospection while writing this paper, that I have 
entertained them fully. The point of these cogitations is a plea for inclusiveness in analysis. It 
is very unwise to approach the analysis of encounters from the viewpoint of speaker 
intention. But this can nevertheless serve as supplement to explanation.     
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has sketched a picture of the practice of interpersonal pragmatics which has a 
different starting point and a different end point from that traditional within pragmatics. As 
regards the latter, it has been observed that the ultimate aim of the enterprise is not the 
understanding of language but rather that of human social relations. As regards the former, it 
has been advocated that instead of starting with the language and then fanning out from there 
to the wider context, it is better to start with the context and then home in on various aspects 
of it. The analysis above has attempted to demonstrate the desirability of this procedure.  
An additional point in this regard can now be made. As exemplified in the analysis 
above, there are crucial aspects of everyday social interaction which are matters of presence 
versus absence. O’Driscoll (1996: 29) offers examples of acts which may or may not be 
performed (and are subject to cross-cultural and cross-situational variability). And Langlotz 
& Locher (2013) stress the importance for participants in interaction of the presence or 
absence of emotional signals relative to norms and expectations. As they exemplify, it can be 
either presence of absence which is the marked case. Yet this dimension is one which an 
exclusive focus on language finds difficult to deal with. Although it has been possible 
through access to introspection to examine the interactive significance of silence for the 
speaker – of words not uttered (e.g. Sifianou 1997, 2003; O’Driscoll 2007b) – a focus limited 
to alternatives within language (one set of words as opposed to a different set) is not able to 
consider the significance of any act – including a verbal one - which is not there but which, 
from a normative and experiential point of view, might be there for participants. 
The overall picture painted, then, entails language suffering a rather drastic relegation 
of status. However, there a number of brakes on this downward movement. Language is not 
being banished to the sidelines. It retains its central place in analysis but its role is different. 
Instead of being the ultimate, background object of research, it is one major tool of research 
into human relating. For a number of reasons, in fact, it is likely to remain the major tool. 
One reason is practical. Words are comparatively easy to work with. They more easily leave 
traces after the event than other kinds of evidence and there are agreed, straightforward ways 
of representing them.  
A second reason is attitudinal. There seems to be general societal agreement that 
people can be held accountable for their words in a way which for their body movements 
(unless these involve physical contact with others) they cannot. There are explicit social and 
sometimes legal sanctions in place regarding, for example, language that is “grossly offensive 
or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character” (British Communications Act 2003) but 
sanctions regarding gestures of the same character are much vaguer. 
A third reason is technological. Although face-to-face interaction, with all its non-
linguistic aspects, remains the fundamental scene of social life – and is arguably the 
prototype frame through which all other types of communication are filtered by interactants 
themselves (see e.g. O’Driscoll 2011: 27) – other kinds of interaction which, in varying 
degrees, reduce or eliminate non-linguistic signals are playing an increasingly great part in 
our lives, including our relational lives. All types of written CMC, for example, are 
effectively disembodied, leaving us with only the words (plus whatever visual symbols are 
available to substitute for prosody).   
Nevertheless, for the purposes of interpersonal pragmatics at least, for the reasons which 
this paper has attempted to outline, interaction should in principle be approached: 
- first and foremost as mere co-presence  
- during which identifiable significant moves may - or may not - take place  
- some of which may - or may not - be verbal 
I offer in this paper, then, in the cause of allowing us to dig deeper into how people do 
relating, a portrait of language as somewhat diminished, unseated from the analytical throne, 
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